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We present here an information theoretic study of Gaussian collective attacks on the continuous
variable key distribution protocols based on Gaussian modulation of coherent states [1, 2, 3]. These
attacks, overlooked in previous security studies, give a finite advantage to the eavesdropper in the
experimentally relevant lossy channel, but are not powerful enough to reduce the range of the reverse
reconciliation protocols. Secret key rates are given for the ideal case where Bob performs optimal
collective measurements, as well as for the realistic cases where he performs homodyne [1, 2] or
heterodyne measurements [3]. We also apply the generic security proof of Christiandl et al. [4] to
obtain unconditionally secure rates for these protocols.
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Over the past few years, quantum continuous vari-
ables (CV) have been explored as an alternative to qubits
for quantum key distribution (QKD) [5, 6, 7]. More
specifically, protocols using coherent states and homo-
dyne [1, 2, 8] or heterodyne [3] measurements have been
proposed and experimentally demonstrated [9, 10]. Re-
lying on technologies allowing much higher rates than
allowed by the single photon detectors used in qubit
based QKD, those protocols are the only ones which
could allow key rates in the GHz range in the foresee-
able future.
However, the security proofs of these new protocols
are not yet as strong as the ones of the qubits-based
protocols: they are almost all limited to individual or
finite-size [11] attacks. To our knowledge, the only un-
conditional security proofs of CV QKD protocols are
[6, 12, 13], only the latter studying coherent-states based
protocols. These proofs all rely on specific suboptimal
key extraction procedures, and, for each case, it’s diffi-
cult to separate the effects of the technical inefficiencies of
the encoding scheme from the more fundamental effect
of real attacks possibility of Eve — the eavesdropper.
In this letter, we study the effects of a Gaussian collec-
tive attack on the key rate of CV QKD protocols based
on the Gaussian modulation of coherent-states [1, 2, 3]
sent through a lossy channel. In these attacks, Eve uses
a Gaussian unitary to interact with each of the transmit-
ted pulse and stores her ancillas into a quantum mem-
ory. She performs then a collective measurement on her
ancillas after Alice and Bob — the partners performing
QKD — have used the public classical channel to fulfill
the protocol.
After introducing the notations used in this letter, we
recall the values of various information theoretic quan-
tities for Gaussian states. Then, we compute the secret
key rate which can be achieved using direct reconcilia-
tion when Bob is allowed to do collective, heterodyne
or homodyne measurements. Those results are then ex-
tended to reverse reconciliation protocols and compared
with the unconditionally secure rates obtained from the
generic security proof of Christiandl et al. [4].
While completing this work, we learned Navascués
and Acín used very similar techniques to study the se-
curity bounds of these protocols [14].
Notations. In all the QKD protocols discussed in this
letter, Alice sends n Gaussian modulated coherent states
through a lossy channel of transmission T.
Bob then makes measurements on the pulses he re-
ceives. It can be an optimal collective measurement or,
more realistically, a series of heterodyne [3] or homo-
dyne [1, 2, 9] measurements. Alice and Bob then agree
on a secret key through a (direct or reverse) reconcilia-
tion procedure. We are interested in the asymptotic key
rates obtained at the limit n → ∞.
In the following, A refers to the quantum state of the
light pulse preparedbyAlice,B andE to the one received
by Bob and Eve. X refers to the (classical) value of Alice’s
modulation and Y to the one of Bob’s measurement. For
instanceHB will denote the VonNeumann entropy of the
density matrix ρB at Bob’s side, while HY will denote the
Shannon differential entropy of Bob’s measurements.
Alicemodulates the two quadraturesQX and PX of the
coherent states she sends with random values following
Gaussian distribution. To simplify the analysis, we will
assume this modulation to be symmetric in Q and P.
If Bob performs a heterodyne measurement, he gets
the twonoisymeasurementsQhetY = QB+Qnoise andP
het
Y =
PB + Pnoise, where Qnoise and Pnoise are two independent
Gaussian random variables of variance 1. (The units
used in this letter correspond to a unity variance of the
vacuum.) If he performs a homodyne measurement,
he perfectly measures one quadrature — let say Q —
and obtains no information on the other — P. One has
therefore QhomY = QB and P
hom
Y = Pnoise (or, of course, the
symmetric case, where PhomY = PB and Q
hom
Y = Qnoise).
The lossy channel is modeled by a beamsplitter of
2transmitivity T and reflectivity 1 − T, the reflected beam
being given to Eve. In the equivalent entanglement-
based scheme [15], this attack gives Eve the purification
of the mixed state ρ⊗nAB shared by Alice and Bob. Eve
then performs a collective measurement on her part of
the purification, after Alice and Bob’s classical commu-
nication has occurred. As shown below, this attack is
more powerful than the ones studied in [1, 2, 3, 9, 11].
However, this attackmodel is not generic in two aspects.
First, the channel model itself is not generic, since we
restrict ourselves to the lossy channel and omit to con-
sider nonzero added-noise and non-Gaussian attacks.
This restriction is only due to brevity consideration and
will be lifted in a longer article [16], which will also con-
tain a study of squeezed states protocols. Of course, in
an experiment, the amount of addednoise has to bemea-
sured by Alice and Bob through some sampling andwill
never be exactly zero. They would thus have to use the
more general results of [16].
A more fundamental restriction comes from the fact
that we suppose Alice and Bob share a state of the form
ρ⊗nAB. In other words, we restrict Eve to individual attacks
on the channel, even if she is allowed to make collective
measurements on the ancillas obtained through these at-
tacks. This restriction will be lifted at the end of this let-
ter, where we apply the generic security proof [4] which
does not rely on any assumption about Eve’s attack.
Entropies and mutual information. Let VQB (VPB) be the
variance in the Q-quadrature (in the P-quadrature) of
the Gaussian state ρB. Since squeezing is a reversible
operation, it doesn’t alter the Von Neumann entropy of
ρB, which is an increasing function of VB :=
√
VQB VPB
[17]:
HB =
VB+1
2 log
VB+1
2 − VB−12 log VB−12
= log VB+12 +
VB−1
2 log
1+1/VB
1−1/VB .
(1)
The logarithms in the above expression should be taken
in base 2 if one wants the result in bits, or in base e if one
wants it in nats. For strong modulation (VB ≫ 1), one
will use the Taylor expansion
HB = logVB + log
e
2 + O
(
1
VB
)
.
LetVQY andVPY be the variances of Bob’s two orthogo-
nal quadraturemeasurements. The Shannon differential
entropy HY is simply the logarithm of VY :=
√
VQY VPY ,
up to an arbitrary additive constant [18], which can be
set to 0:
HY = logVY. (2)
The rate of common information Alice and Bob can
extract from their classical values is given by the mutual
information [18]
IX;Y := HY − HY|X = HX +HY − HXY.
If Bob uses a heterodyne detection, which adds a unit of
noise, VhetY = VB + 1. Since a coherent state sent through
a lossy channel stays a coherent state, the conditional
variance are VB|X = 1 and VhetY|X = VB|X + 1 = 2. One has
therefore
IhetX;Y = log
VB+1
2 . (3)
If Bob is allowed to make arbitrary measurements on
the pulses, the information they share is then given by
the Holevo information [19, 20]
IX;B := HB − HB|X,
which is attained by collectivemeasurements. Since Bob
receives pure (coherent) states, HB|X = 0 and
IX;B = HB = I
het
X;Y +
VB−1
2 log
1+1/VB
1−1/VB . (4)
If VB ≫ 1, one has
IX;B = I
het
X;Y + log e + O
(
1
VB
)
. (5)
Therefore, by using heterodyne detection instead of the
optimal collective measurement, Bob loses an amount of
information up to log e (i.e. 1 nat ≃ 1.44 bits) per pulse.
Direct key distribution. Toattain the rate IX;Y, Alice and
Bob can use random codes of size exp(nIX;Y), where the
basis of the logarithms and the exponential are the same.
Devetak andWinter have recently shown [21] that Alice
can divide this code into privacy amplification subsets
of size close to exp(nIX;E). This allows Alice and Bob
to generate a secret key through a direct reconciliation
procedure using only forward communication. This key
can be generated at a rate asymptotically close to
∆I⊲ := IX;Y − IX;E. (6)
If Bobmakes the optimal collectivemeasurement, sub-
stituting IcollX;Y = IX;B in the above expression and using
equation (4) (withVB = TVA+1−T andVE = (1−T)VA+T)
gives us the attainable direct reconciliation key rate. At
the high modulation limit, where VA ≫ 1/T; 1/(1 − T),
one has [22]
∆Icoll
⊲
= log T1−T + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)
.
This limit is the same as the one found assuming Bob
and Eve are restricted to heterodyne measurements [3]
(individual attacks).
Direct heterodyne key distribution. The equation (6) can
be applied to the case where Bob uses heterodyne detec-
tion [3]. We have then a lossy channel of transmission
T between Alice and Bob and another lossy channel of
transmission 1−T between Alice and Eve. We can there-
fore use the equations (3) and (4) to expand this expres-
sion into
∆Ihet
⊲
= log VB+1VE+1 − 1VE−12 log
1+1/VE
1−1/VE .
3As shown by equation (5), Eve can gain up to 1 nat
per pulse by using collective measurement. The best
situation for Alice and Bob is the high modulation limit
VA ≫ 11−T , where
∆Ihet
⊲
= log T1−T
1
e + O
(
1
(1−T)VA
)
.
It is therefore not possible to perform direct heterodyne
QKD if the channel transmission is smaller than Thet
min
=
e/(e + 1) ≃ 0.73. These maximal losses of 1.4 dB imply
a shorter range for this protocol than the 3 dB deduced
if one only considers individual attacks or if Bob uses
optimal collective measurements.
Direct homodyne key distribution. Surprisingly, the
original proposal [1] of direct homodyneQKDismore ro-
bust. For those protocols, Alice modulates both quadra-
turesQ andPwith the samevarianceVA andBob chooses
randomly one quadrature to measure (let say Q). After
the public disclosure of this quadrature choice, the in-
formation on P is useless and can be forgotten by Alice.
The state she has sent to Bob is therefore a mixture of co-
herent states with a given value of Q but different values
of P. The mixture received by Bob is a Gaussian mixed
states with variancesVhom
QB |X = 1 and V
hom
PB|X = VB, therefore
VhomB|X =
√
VB. When
√
VB ≫ 1, one has [22]
HhomB|X = log
√
VB + log
e
2 + O
(
1√
VB
)
(7)
HhomB = logVB + log
e
2 + O
(
1
VB
)
IhomX;B =
1
2 logVB + O
(
1√
VB
)
= IhomX;Y + O
(
1√
VB
)
.
Thus, collectivemeasurements only give a small amount
(of order 1/
√
VB) of supplementary information over
homodyne detection, the noise in the useless quadrature
(P) plays a crucial role in this.
Eve receives similar mixed states, and, in the strong
modulation regime (VA ≫ 1/T; 1/(1− T)), one has
∆Ihom
⊲
= 12 log
T
1−T + O
({
1√
T
+ 1√
1−T
}
1√
VA
)
.
The advantage given to Eve by collective measurements
is therefore of order 1/
√
VA and can be arbitrarily re-
duced by Alice’s use of a strong enough modulation.
Therefore, unlike the heterodyne protocol, the key rate of
the direct homodyne key distribution protocol remains
almost unchanged when compared to [1], where Eve
was restricted to (postponed) homodynemeasurements.
More specifically the range limit of this protocol stays at
3 dB (50 %) of losses, whether one considers collective
measurements or not.
Reverse key generation. For symmetry reasons, back-
ward communication is needed distribute a quantum
key beyond this 3 dB limit. Either postselection [8, 12]
or a reverse reconciliation procedure [2, 3, 9] can be used
for this purpose. In the latter case, the attainable rate is
given by [21]
∆I⊳ := IX;Y − IY;E.
If Bob performs an optimal collective measurement,
one has to replace the above expression by IX;B − IB;E,
where IB;E is the quantum mutual information
IB;E := HB +HE − HBE.
Since the joint state ρBE is obtained by the (reversible)
mixture of ρA and a vacuum state in the mode N, one
has HBE = HA + HN = HA. At the high modulation limit
(VA ≫ 1/T; 1/(1− T)), one has therefore [22]
IB;E = logVA + logT(1 − T) e2 + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)
∆Icoll
⊳
= log 11−T + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)
,
which is, like in the direct case, very close to the result
obtained with heterodyne detection in an individual at-
tacks scenario [3]. For strong losses (1/VA ≪ T ≪ 1),
this expression becomes
∆Icoll
⊳
= T log e + O
(
T2 + 1TVA
)
.
Reverse heterodyne key generation. In the heterodyne
case [3], which is symmetric in Q and P, one has
VhetPE|Y = V
het
QE |Y := VQE −
〈QEQhetY 〉2
Vhet
QY
=
2−T+T/VA
T+(2−T)/VA ,
HhetE|Y = log
1+1/VA
T+(2−T)/VA +
(1−T)(1−1/VA)
T+(2−T)/VA log
1+1/VA
(1−T)(1−1/VA) .
When VA ≫ 1/T, this expression becomes
HhetE|Y = log
1−T
T − 1T log(1 − T) + O
(
1
TVA
)
.
If one also has VA ≫ 1/(1 − T), [22]
HE = logVA + log
e
2 (1 − T) + O
(
1
(1−T)VA
)
IhetY;E = log
e
2TVA +
1
T log(1 − T) + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)
∆Ihet
⊳
= 1T log
1
1−T − log e + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)
As in the direct case, Eve gains a finite amount of in-
formation by using collective measurement instead of
heterodyne measurements. However this gain is not
sufficient to reduce the range of the protocol, which
still works for arbitrary long ranges. For strong losses
(1/VA ≪ T ≪ 1), the rate is twice smaller than the col-
lective measurement rate
∆Ihet
⊳
= 12T log e + O
(
T2 + 1TVA
)
≃ 12∆Icoll⊳ .
4Reverse homodyne key generation In the homodyne
case [2], similar calculations give us:
VhomQE |Y =
1
T+(1−T)/VA
VhomPE |Y = VE = (1 − T)VA + T
VhomE|Y =
√
VA
1−T+T/VA
T+(1−T)/VA
In the large modulation limit (VA ≫ 1/T; 1/(1− T)) [22],
VhomE|Y =
√
VA
1−T
T
[
1 + O
(
{ 1T + 11−T } 1VA
)]
HhomE|Y =
1
2 log
1−T
T VA + log
e
2 + O
(
1
TVA
+
√
T
(1−T)VA
)
IhomY;E =
1
2 log(1 − T)TVA + O
(
1
TVA
+
√
T
(1−T)VA
)
∆Ihom
⊳
= 12 log
1
1−T + O
(
1
TVA
+
√
T
(1−T)VA
)
As for the direct case, the use of homodyne detection by
Alice andBoballows them to reduce the advantage given
to Eve by coherent measurement to an arbitrarily small
amount and to attain a secret key rate arbitrarily close to
the one given in [2], where only individual attacks were
considered. In the strong losses regime (1/VA ≪ T ≪ 1),
the rate obtained is almost equal to the one obtained in
heterodyne measurements:
∆Ihom
⊳
= 12T log e + O
(
T2 + 1TVA
)
≃ ∆Ihet
⊳
.
The (almost) factor 2 advantage in rate given by het-
erodyne measurement at low losses cancels for strong
losses. The use of the homodyne setup is also attractive
in experimental QKD because of the sensitivity of the
current continuous variable reconciliation algorithms
[23, 24] to the signal-to-noise ratio.
Unconditional security One can also compare these
rates to the unconditionaly secure rates S obtained from
the generic security proof of Christiandl et al. [4]
S = IX;Y − HE, (8)
which is independent of the reconciliation direction.
Since Alice sends coherent states, as shown above HE =
IX;E and this unconditional secure rate is equal to the
direct reconciliation rate ∆Icoll
⊲
(∆Ihet
⊲
) when Bob makes
collective (heterodyne) measurements, regardless of the
actual reconciliation direction (direct or reverse).
The role of the unmeasured (P-)quadrature modula-
tion makes the homodyne case different. If it decreased
the efficiency of the collective attacks considered above,
it increases the entropy HE, decreasing the secure rate S
given by equation (8). However, giving the information
about this modulation to Eve could only decrease the
secret rate. HE is then given by (7) and, in the strong
modulation regime (VA ≫ 1/(1− T)), (8) becomes [22]
Shom = 12 log
T
1−T
4
e2
+ O
(
1√
(1−T)VA
)
Unconditionally secure homodyne QKD is therefore
possible if the channel transmission T is greater than
Thom
min
= e2/(e2 + 4) ≃ 0.65 (1.9 dB)
Conclusion We have quantified the effect of collec-
tive attacks on coherent states based CV QKD proto-
cols through a lossy channel. These attacks are strictly
more powerful than the individual attacks studied be-
fore. However, if Bob makes homodyne measurements,
the advantage given to Eve by these attacks can bemade
arbitrarily small if Alice uses a strong modulation. On
the contrary, if Bob uses heterodynemeasurement, these
attacks give a finite advantage to Eve. For comparison,
we have computed the key rate in the (theoretical) opti-
mal case, where Bob performs a collectivemeasurement.
We also have applied the generic security proof of
Christiandl et al. [4] to compute an unconditional secure
rate for these protocols. This rate is usually lower than
the one obtained above, but, this bound being known
not to be tight, this does not rule out the possibility for
the considered collective attacks to be optimal.
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